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THE STATUS OF FOREMEN AS "EMPLOYEES"
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
HERMAN E. COOPER*
W HETHER foremen are "employees" under the National Labor
Relations Act1 awaits final determination by the Supreme Court.2
Wider interest probably has been stirred by this controversy than by
any similar labor relations question currently subject to judicial review.3
It affects the only broadly significant section of the Act which remains
thus unsettled.4
Nature of the Problem
The Court in 1937 upheld the power of Congress to legislate the
right of "employees" to organize and engage in concerted action.' Since
then a line of decisions has illuminated the meaning and application of
many of the principal provisions of the Act as administered by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.' However, the highest judicial tribunal
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151, et seq (1940).
2. Matter of NLRB v. Packard Motor Car Co., 157 F. (2d) 80, 18 LAB. REL. RPP. Man.
2268 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946). Petition for rehearing was denied by the Circuit Court on
September 30, 1946, 18 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 2432. Following original decision oi Aug.
12, 1946, the Packard Motor Car Company announced that if such rehearing was denied,
the case would be taken to the Supreme Court. 18 LAB. REt. REP. 295 (1946). Such
an appeal was filed with the Supreme Court on Oct. 30, 1946. See GREGORY, LABOR AND
THE LAW (1946) 324.
3. LEVENSTEIN, LABOR TODAY AND TOmORROW (1945) 119-120; the author estimates
five million foremen would be affected by a Supreme Court decision in the Packard case
supra; PETERSON, AmERiCAN LABOR UNIONS (1945) 90-97. TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
NLRB (1945) 30-35. Former NLRB member Gerald D. Reilly has stated that it is a
problem which transcends all others in labor relations, N. Y. TnmrS, Nov. 8, 1946, p. 35,
col. 3.
4. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW (1946) 289-333. The cases arising under the National
Labor Relations Act comprise more than half of the labor cases which have been decided
by the Supreme Court in the period since June, 1940. These concerned cases involving
interference, restraint and coercion, domination and interference with the formation and
administration of labor organizations, discrimination, and collective bargaining. WALLACE
LABOR LAW (1946) 21 IND. L. J. 235.
5. Matter of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1, (1937).
6. For some of the leading cases, see: The Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103
(1937); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938); Consolidated
Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197 (1938); NLRB v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241 (1939); Amalgamated Utility Workers v.
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc., 309 U. S. 261 (1940) ; National Licorice Co.
v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350 (1940); H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 514 (1941);
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has yet to review the decision of the Board in the Packard case' which
expresses a fundamental departure from previously prevailing policy in
that groups of supervisors are by that decision presently included within
the orbit of the statute.
Aside from the immediate legal implications, the policy under review
strikes a challenging note in the field of labor-management relations.
Its effect is firmly but differently regarded as (1) a disturbing and
unwarranted intrusion into the core of managerial control of enterprise,'
(2) a realistic adaptation of process by administrative legislation to a
new economic realignment,9 or (3) an inescapable consequence of clear
Congressional purpose without regard to its general impact -on the in-
diistrial scene except possibly as a quieting influence on an otherwise
potential source of labor unrest."°
From the vigor and scope of the contending positions, it is trans-
parently clear that a more fundamental difference divides the conflicting
views than an abstract juridical question. Actually, the basic dispute
involves the extent to which the National Labor Relations Board may
narrow the margin between top managerial hierarchy and the lower
echelons of employees. The ultimate effect of the Board's decision in*
the Packard case, which thus narrows the margin, must be considered
in terms of a consequent change in the character of management as
no longer embracing all groups of supervisors. The resultant stratifi-
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146 (1941); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685
(1942); Virginia Electric & P. Co. v. NLRB, 319 U. S. 533 (1943); J. I. Case Company
v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 678
(1944); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U. S. 248 (1944); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945); See
also discussions in: 2 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 1043 (1938); 4 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 1073
(1939); 5 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 1130 (1940); 10 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 1285 (1942);
12 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 2546 (1943); 14 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 2556 (1944).
7. Matter of Packard Motor Car Co. and Foreman's Association of America, 64
N.L.R.B. 1212; 17 LAB. REL. REP. 506, 17 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 163 (1945); Employer
found to have violated NLRA by refusal to meet with certified union representative of
foremen employees after determination by NLRB upholding as appropriate a unit of
foremen in representation proceeding. 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 LAB. REr.. REP. 168, 16 LAB.
REL. REP. Man. 43 (1945).
8. Following initial Board decision in the Packard case, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945) directing
election, spokesman for Automotive Council for War Production indignantly framed the
issue: "Who is going to run the plants?" 16 LAB. REL. REP. 209 (1945).
9. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw, (1946) 321; see dissenting opinion of Chairman
Millis in re Maryland Drydock Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943) in which he referred
to the Board's refusal to include foremen under the .Act as an appropriate unit, as
''administrative legislation."
10. Majority opinion in re Packard case, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
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cation of management into "policy-makers" only," necessarily conveys
more importance than a mere grant to foremen of collective bargaining
rights under government protection, and certain obvious developments,
far beyond the precise and circumscribed matter at issue, can be ex-
pected to flow from a Supreme Court affirmance of the Circuit Court
in the Packard case. The stern resistance of Industry to coalescing in-
dividual supervisors into collective units, with joint bargaining and
-concerted means of channelling grievances, is likely to continue un-
abated. 2 In part such an attitude appears to spring from a fond attach-
ment to a lingering tradition that "management" is an all-embracing
relationship with the company president at one terminal point and the
lowliest foreman at the other. Within that broad range the effort has
been to develop an esprit-de-corps which not only serves to plan and
direct the activities of the enterprise but also to provide a bulwark
against what is regarded as the growing encroachment of unions upon
the "prerogatives" of management.'3
To find a rank of stipervisors, then, not only eager for unionization
of their own, but willing to strike for this recognition, 4 has compelled
a re-evaluation of the entire relationship. The occurrence is most fre-
quent in large scale industry. This is wholly understandable since there
the unquiet of the supervisors is bred of the impersonality which' is
largely unavoidable in mass production. 5 Whether it is that develop-
11. President C. E. Wilson of General Motors stated that if foremen elected to join
unions, the Company would be forced to re-define their duties, train new management
personnel, reduce the status of foremen and turn their managerial functions to others.
The Packard Motor Car Company advised its foremen if they voted for a union in the
approaching N LRB election they might well become the "traffic cops," the characterization
of them used by the NLRB in its decision. 16 LAB. REL. REP. 209 (1945).
12. Following the Board decision in the Packard case, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), the
Company issued a letter to its foremen in which it stated in part: "It is our intention
to continue to oppose by all proper and legal means the union representation of foremen."
16 LAB. REL. REP. 209, 210 (1945).
13. Employer Opposition to Foremen's Bargaining, 16 LAB. REL. REP. 209 (1945).
14. For a discussion of foremen's efforts to achieve recognition through strikes, see
Huddle, Unionization of Foremen, (1944), EDITORIAL RESEARCHr REPORTS, Vol. I, No. 21,
pp. 379-380; The Unionization of Foremen, (1945) AMSERICAN MANA AErET Ass', RE-
SEARCr REPORTS No. 6, p. 13; PETERSON, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 96.
15. The enormous expansion of large scale industry, especially during the recent war,
produced a substantial increase in the number of supervisory employees and foremen.
Many rank and file workers were elevated to supervisory positions which they feared
to lose by being laid off or demoted when contract cancellations and consequent cutbacks
might occur. The National War Labor Board Special Panel found that the interest of
these employees in collective bargaining was inspired by two principal causes:
"(1) The desire of foremen to retain their jobs, which they know to be un-
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ment or the incitement of the Wagner Act itself, which has inspired
foremen's union organization, is an interesting but perhaps fruitless
speculation as to cause and effect which may be indulged in equally
in respect to much current legislation. 6 Sufficient for the purposes of
this discussion that a situation exists- to which a legislative device has
been applied and as to which the appropriate administrative agency and
the courts have spoken.
Scope of the National Labor Relations Act
The design of the statute is to minimize interruptions of commerce
induced by the refusal of employers to recognize and bargain collectively
with representatives lawfully chosen by their employees.' 7 Functionally,
the Board has the responsibility of applying administrative and judicial
procedures involving the prohibition and correction of unfair labor prac-
tices, the holding of elections for the selection of representatives and
the determination of appropriate units for collective bargaining. 8
The specific -statutory provisions from which the controversy gen-
erated as to foremen's rights under the National Labor Relations Act
are Section 2; subsections (2)19 and (3)2° and Section 7.21 Under Sec-
tion 2 (2), "The term 'employer' includes any person acting in the in-
terests of an employer, directly or indirectly .... ." Section .2 (3) states
that "The term 'employee' shall include any employee.... Section
7 declares the legislative objective to be as follows:
usually good ones, and to escape demotions when cutbacks come; and (2) the
desire of the foremen for freer interchange of viewpoints with higher manage-
ment particularly better opportunities to present such grievances as may arise."
Matter of NLRB v. Packard Motor Car Co. 157 F. (2d) 80, 18 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 2268,
2270, (C. C. A. 6th, August 12, 1946).
16. "It is doubtful," wrote Professor Gray as to "whether at all stages of legal his-
tory, rules laid down by judges have not generated custom, rather than custom generated
the rules." NATURE AND SOURCES Or TiE LAw (1909), Sec. 634.- The same observation
has validity when applied to the growing influence of legislation as changing rather
than reflecting the mores of the community.
17. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940); GREGORY, oP. cit. supra, note 2,
pp. 229-235; NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1944).
18. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (1940); 49 STAT. 1921 (1936), 29
U. S. C. § 160 (1940), GREGORY, Op. cit. supra, note 2, pp. 235-252.
19. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2) (1940); NLRB v. Lund, 103 F. (2d)
815 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
20. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3) (1940); NLRB v. Fansteel Metal-
lurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1944).
21. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1940); Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v.
Lodge 66, 295 Ill. App. 323, 14 N. E. (2d) 991 (1938).
22. The only categories excluded were agricultural employees, domestics and children,
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"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing,-and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
The Board's jurisdiction requires a finding initially that a question
exists between an employer and "employees" entitled to the protection
of the legislative pattern evolved for their benefit." The limited propo-
sition here considered relates to the scope of the statutory term "em-
ployee"; does it encompass foremen so as to entitle them to collective
bargaining rights under the Act?
The Board in Quest of a Policy
Although this question is novel as presented for judicial review, it
was not so in the history of the Board's consideration of the general
problem. The Packard case, however, represented a departure from the
previously prevailing doctrine in accordance with which foremen were
excluded from bargaining rights in separate units under the Act. On
this issue the Board had most recently adhered ,to the "principles" re-
flected by the Maryland Drydock case. -24 Prior thereto, the policy had
fluctuated between granting and disallowing recognition of such units
of foremen. Significantly enough it was not until seven years after the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act that the Board was first
confronted with the issue of a separate unit for supervisory employees.25
Until that occasion, the Board's concern with foremen was solely as to.
whether as a "fringe" group they should be included or excluded from
units of rank and file workers. On this subject the Act itself provided
two broad standards: To determine the desire of the employees and
to increase the bargaining power of workers. 26 No other guides are
contained in the Act foi the exercise of the Board's discretion. Only
its decisions disclose the principles on which its determinations are made.
husbands or wives of employers. It would appear that the exceptions were made solely
"for administrative reasons." SEN. REP. No. 595, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935) p. 7.
23. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. Sec. § 159 (c) (1940); M-ontgomery Ward
Employees Assn. v. Retail Clerks International Protective Assn., Local No. 47, 38 F.
Supp. 321 (N. D. Cal. 1941); this includes "wrongfully discharged employees;" NLRB
v. Carlisle Lbr. Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); and striking employees,
NLRB v. Mackay R. & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938).
24. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943). See Note (1945) 5 NAT. LAWYERs GUILD REv. 44 for an
analysis of the Maryland Drydock decision.
25. Matter of Union Collieries Coal Company, 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942); Matter of
Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942).
26. See note 17 supra; 29 U. S. C. § 159; MEIz, LABOR POLICY Or THE FEDERAL Gov-
ERNMENT (1945) 91.
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Nor does the Board state with any precision what standards it will
apply in any particular case. As a consequence it is not always clear
in advance which principle announced by the Board will apply."
In the light of the current decisions of the Board, particularly the
fundamental criterions announced in the Packard case, the earlier views
and treatment of the problem require underscoring. The Board was
constantly in search of a formula which would reconcile the conflicts
inherent in the marginal status of foremen. Whether to include foremen
in the same appropriate bargaining unit with the rank and file employees
at all times posed a delicate dilemma. So, in the Consumers' Power
Company case,28 for instance, crew foremen were at first included in
the same bargaining unit with production employees. Shortly thereafter
the Board, by a supplementary ruling, excluded crew foremen when
one "of that group involved management in an unfair labor practice
situation.29 In other early cases, when Board policy was particularly
fluid, in practice although not so in expression, supervisory employees
would be automatically excluded from the same unit of their subordinates
unless their inclusion was affirmatively justifiedV ° Such tests as were
applied touched upon the nature and extent of the supervisory authority
possessed by the foremen involved. No serious controversy as to their
exclusion arose in cases in which it was demonstrated that the foreman
enjoyed the power to hire and fire or could exercise controlling influence
in that regard as well in the recommendation of wage increases, transfers
or promotions for those employees in whose unit it was sought to have
the foremen included.3'
A further standard which was utilized to determine whether super-
visory employees could be embraced by the same unit as their subordi-
nates rested upon the degree of proximity of this supervision group to
management as distinguished from their being part of the working
forces32 The Board contended in sutch matters that supervisors should
be excluded where in the bargaining process their interests were more
27. Ibid.
28. 9 N.L.R.B. 701 (1938).
29. 9 N.L.R.B. 742 (1938).
30. Matter of Pacific Manifold Book Co. Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 551 (1937); Matter of
Keystone Mfg. Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 172 (1938); Matter of Union Envelope Co., 10 N.L.R.B.
1147 (1939).
31. Matter of Kingsley Lumber Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 174 (1939); Matter of Nekoosa-
Edwards Paper Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 446 (1939); Matter of Zellerbach Paper Co., 4
N.L.R.B. 348 (1937).
32. Matter of Rockwood Alabama Stone Co., 40 N.L.R.B. 790 (1942); Matter of
Ford Motor Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 342 (1940).
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akin to those of management.' This was demonstrable where it was
shown that such employees directed the work of others by giving orders,
apportioning work, enforcing discipline and being responsible for main-
taining productivity levels as to quantity and quality8
Another factor which resolved the Board's decisions in many cases
depended upon the attitude of the unions involved. So, if the union
desired to exclude supervisory employees, the Board was disposed to
accept that position as controlling 5 By the same token, the request
of the unions to include foremen has generally been adopted by the
Board, especially where all the unions involved in the controversy ex-
pressed the same wish. 6 Foremen have even been included where one
of the unions urged their inclusion and another contending union made
no contest.37 Frequently, however, it has been sufficient merely for
one of the unions involved to object for such supervisory employees
to be excluded8 In case of any conflict as to inclusion or exclusion,
the Board has in most instances ruled against having foremen in the
same unit as rank and file workers 9 Management exercised little in-
fluence on this issue with the Board.40 The general principle appeared
to be that the desire of the employees should be controlling if other
factors were relatively balanced. As a general rule, it might be stated
that the Board was likely to include foremen if they were eligible for
union membership or if their inclusion was in accord with the prevailing
practice in the industry.41
The other facet of the problem of immediate concern related to the
grouping only of supervisory employees in particular units appropriate
for collective bargaining. In Matter of Union Collieries Coal Company,2
the Board in apparently decisive fashion found appropriate a unit of
assistant foremen, fire bosses, weight bosses and coal inspectors. A
33. Matter of Goodyear Tire & Rubber -Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 431 (1937).
34. Matter of Charles McCormick Lumber Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 38 (1938). Matter of
3. Tartel & Son, 45 N.L.R.B. 551 (1942).
35. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146 ((1941); Matter of Medo
Photo 'Supply Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 989 (1942); Matter of Inland Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B.
783 (1938).
36. Matter of Willys Overland Motors, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 924 (1938); Matter of Rich-
mond Hosiery Mills, 8 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1938).
37. Matter of the Harris-Hub Bed & Spring Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1939).
38. Matter of Jones Lumber Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 209 (1939).
39. Matter of Western Pipe & Steel Co. of Calif., 17 N.L.R.B. 942 (1939).-
40. Matter of A. Fink & Sons, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 441 (1938).
41. Matter of J. C. Sanders Cotton Mills Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 298 (1941); Matter of
Lidz Bros., Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. 757 (1938).
42. 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942).
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local CIO union was thereafter'certified in Matter of Godchaux Sugars43
for-working and non-working foremen but excluding general foremen.
In the succeeding two cases on the same question, however, the Board
rejected as not appropriate a unit consisting of managers, assistant
managers, utilitarians and treasurers in a theater chain 44 as well as
a unit of general foremen and assistant foremen of an aircraft company."
The conflict among the members of the Board was revealed in full
measure by the differences expressed in the decision in the Union Col-
lieries Coal case where the issue was first squarely presented. Here
the Board had ruled that supervisory employees enjoyed the rights of
the Act for collective bargaining purposes. Chairman Harry A. Millis
and William M. Leiserson supported the unit while Gerald Reilly dis-
sented and made a reductio ad absurdum argument to the effect that:
"A literal interpretation of the statute would mean that even the presi-
dent, vice-president -and treasurer of a corporation have a right to col-
lective bargaining since they are also employees; ... ", that the status
of supervisors would be so compromised "as to result in disruption of
the practice of collective bargaining rather than industrial peace;" that
management's informed representatives would be sitting with the union
during the bargaining process; and finally that management would be
improperly involved by the respondeat superior doctrine which would
make it responsible for the acts of supervisors.46 The first real indi-
cation that the Board was attempting to reconcile its conflicts by re-
fining the issue was revealed by the decision in the Studebaker Cor-
poration case." Here the Board was confronted with the issue of whether
to sanction two units in one department, .each of which-would include
various categories of supervision. In dismissing the union's petition
for certification the Board drew its authority from the Boeing Aircraft"
and Godchaux Sugars49 cases. These cases respectively held that a
single bargaining unit could not be composed of various levels of super-
visory and non-supervisory employees. However, these same cases were
also authority for the broad principle that units of supervisory em-
ployees were appropriate. In substance then the Board was already
43. 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942).
44. Matter of Stanley Co. of America, 45 N.L.R.B. 625 (1942).
45. Matter of Boeing Aircraft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943); see also Matter of Murray
Corp. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 94 (1943) ; Matter of General Motors Corp., 51 N.L.R.B.
457 (1943).
46. Mr. Reilly's dissent later became the majority view in the Maryland Drydock case.
47. 46 N.L.R.B. 1315 (1943).
48. 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943).
49. 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942).
[Vol. is
1946] THE STATUS OF FOREMEN AS "EMPLOYEES"
-veering away from the initial position that foremen could properly
form their own unit under the Wagner Act. The decision in the Stude-
baker case discloses the whittling away of that policy by a forced
refinement of the facts to arrive at a narrow distinction.
The Maryland Drydock case"0 reflected a complete rejection of the
intial policy of the Board on the foremen issue by specifically overruling
the decisions in the Union Collieries and Godchaux Sugars cases. The
Board now declared its "firm" policy to be that, with the exception
of the printing and maritime trades where foremen traditionally- were
organized, units of foremen would not be accepted as appropriate for
collective bargaining purposes. This policy was articulated on the
premise that such units would "impede the processes of collective bar-
gaining, disrupt established managerial and production techniques and
militate against effectuation of the policies of the Act." 1 The decision
was by a divided Board with both views forcefully set forth in the
opinions. It was apparent that feeling on the issue was neither detached
nor affable.52
The completely divergent views, both as to the meaning of the Act
and the effect of its application, which separated the members of the
Board on this issue, also revealed their -conflicting philosophies. So,
when the Maryland Drydock case was decided, it was not unexpected
that it would be by a divided Board. A majority, in this instance com-
posed of Gerald Reilly and John M. Houston, took the position that
the Act's purposes would not be accomplished by establishing bargaining
units of supervisory employees except where of long and customary
standing, such as in the maritime and printing trades. Chairman Millis,
who had voted with the majority in the Union Collieries case, main-
tained the same position as there assumed although now in a dissenter's
role. The holding in the Maryland Drydock case was broadly justified
upon a consideration of "the dangers inherent in the co-mingling of
management and employee functions" and "the possible restrictive effect
upon the organizational freedom of rank and file employees. 53 In
50. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
51. The crux of the conflict appeared centered in the ultimate effect on the Industria"
scene of the Board's policy, as the controlling determinant. A writer then considered
that the majority "made their decision on the basis of prophecy and theory rather than
on the history and experience of the problem and of the organizations involved." Note
(1943) 3 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 53.
52. For an early discussion of the effect of the Board's changing personnel see, Note
(1942) 55 HARV. L. REv. 269.
53. The converse conclusion was drawn by the majority in the Packard case to arrive
at a diametrically opposite result.
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applying the Act, the Board as then constituted, was persuaded by
what it anticipated would be the practical consequences of its rule and
adopted the views of Member Reilly.
The Maryland Drydock doctrine was later somewhat delimited by the
Soss Manufacturing case.5 4 Here was evidenced the natural outgrowth
of the basic conflict resulting from the effort of the Board to predicate
a rule of convenience in terms of concrete principles. For the decision
in the Soss Manufacturing case held to be improper the refusal to issue
a complaint against an employer which'had discharged foremen for
union activity. This placed foremen in the peculiar position of being
granted protection under Sections 8 (1) " and 8 (3)"3 but being at
the same time denied the protection of Section 8 (5)" 7 and Section
958 of the National Labor Relations Act. The~effect therefore, was that
such supervisory employees were afforded redress from unfair labor
practices under the Act but denied access to representation proceedings.
The Soss Manufacturing case in some measure foreshadowed the de-
velopment of Board attitude on the question of foremen, as reflected
by the subsequent Packard case59 decision. However, in the process
54. 56 N.L.R.B. 348 (1944); Note (1946) 59 HARV. L. REv. 606.
55. Unfair labor practice for an employer: "To interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 49 STAT.
452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (1) (1940).
56. Unfair labor practice for an employer: "By discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in
the National Industrial Recovery Act (U. S. C., Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as
amended from time to time, or in any code or agreement approved or prescribed there-
under, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude any employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require, as a condition
of employment, membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of
the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit
covered by such agreement when made." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3)
(1940).
57. Unfair labor practice for an employer: "To refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a)." 49
STAT. 452 (1935) 29 U. S. C. § 158 (5) (1940.
58. "(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of em-
ployees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer." 49
STAT,. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a) (1940).
59. 47 N.L.R.B. 932 (1943).
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of formulating what it hoped would be a durable policy, the Board in
a relatively consistent fashion followed the Maryland Drydock decision"°
until it reversed this position in the Pckard case. -
The Packard case afforded the Board a new opportunity to reconsider
the problem. Again, a divided opinion issued, the majority now being
former Chairman Millis and Member Houston, who had reversed his
position, and the dissenter now being Gerald Reilly.0" It is evident that
both Millis and Reilly clung tenaciously to their disparate convictions
and represented the polar extremities on this question.
The- Rule of the Packard Case
Directly at variance with its previous policy, a recent series of Board
decisions, 2 led by the decision in the Packard case, concluded that
foremen were "employees" within the meaning of Section 2 (3) of the
Act. By qualitative analysis the terms "employees" and "employers"
as stated in the Act were found not to be mutually exclusive. Rather
the pro tanto difference was considered to depend for applied meaning
upon particular behaviour or relationship incidents than upon mere
nomenclature in any absolute sense. While recognizing that foremen,
as marginal employees, have a dual capacity, being deemed part of
management in dealing with the rank and file, it was determined that
their relation to the company which they served was that of employees.
This crucial distinction was predicated upon the evident fact that fore-
men are hired, discharged, paid and directed in their work and their
employment conditions determined, by their employer, and that they
are without real participation in formulating management policy. They
60. See note 50 supra.
61. Comment, Rights of Supervisory Employees to Collective Bargaining Under the
National Labor Relations Act (1946) 55 YALE L. J. 754.
62. Matter of B. F. Goodrich Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 692 (1946);
Matter of L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 59, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 687
(1946); Matter of Midland Steel Products Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 177, 17 LAB. REL. REP.
858 (1946); Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 17 LAB. REL.
REP. 971 (1946); Matter of American Brake Shoe Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 25, 17 LAB. REL. REP.
1264 (1946); Matter of Hudson Motor Car Co., 67 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 17 LAB. REL. REP.
1259 (1946); Matter of U. S. Rubber Co., 67 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 18 LAB. REtL. REP. Man.
1025 (1946); Matter of Ethyl Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. No. 176, 18 LAB. REt. REP. Man.
1068 (1946); Matter of First National Stores, Inc., 68 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 18 LAB. REr..
REP. Man. 1137 (1946); Matter of Simmons Company, Case No. 2-C-6244, 70 N.R.L.B.
-, 18 LAB. REr.. REP. Man. 1356 (1946).
63. The job title does not control on whether an employee is supervisory; see Matter
of Richards Chemical Works, Inc., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 617 (1945),
where "foremen" were not held to be supervisory employees.
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function "in a sort of unenviable limbo between real management and
the workers".64 The decision fundamentally modified the earlier stand
of the Board and frankly subordinated a theoretical hypothesis to the
Board's current concept of economic realities.
The single bargaining unit found as appropriate in the Packard case
included the four levels of supervisory employees-general foremen,
foremen, assistant foremen and special assignment men. 5 The respon-
sibility and authority of these foremen were co-extensive.66 For a long
time, however, the nature of the foreman's position in management had
been undergoing a gradual change. The foreman was progressively exer-
cising less authority coupled with reduced responsibility for influencing
policy with a concomitant increase in responsibility for carrying out
policies:67 In essence, the impact of technological advances in mass
production has changed the functional relationship of foremen -so that
much of the plenary authority and discretion formerly enjoyed had di-
minished.68  Accordingly the importance and consequent sense of se-
curity of supervisory employees decreased proportionately. It was a
short step for this group actively to seek the protection of the Wagner
Act which would afford governmental support and sanction to their
bargaining aims.69
The Packard case, as the landmark of the prevailing doctrine resolv-
ing the marginal status of foremen under the Act, provides a convenient
arena in which to survey the contending positions. All phases of the
question were carefully weighed and considered and a comprehensive,
although somewhat contradictory opinion issued.
64. GREGORY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 322.
65. More than 1,100 supervisory employees were involved: 125 general foremen, 643
foremen, 273 assistant foremen and 65 special assignment men. They constituted the
ranks of supervision below some 77 members of the Employer's managerial hierarchy
from President to Division Superintendents. Volume III of the Record, p. 1814-1815.
66. The employer urged that since, some grades of foremen exercised supervisory
powers over foremen in other grades, each grade of foreman should be segregated, into
a separate unit. The Board has frequently found that a unit otherwise appropriate was
not rendered inappropriate by the circumstances here involved. Matter of Celotex Corp.,
66 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 17 LAB. RET. REP. 984 (1946). In the only such case contested,
the Board's order was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 146 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) cert. denied, 325 U. S. 886
(1945).
67. Majority opinion by Circuit Judge Allen in NLRB v. Packard Motor Car Co.,
157 F. (2d) 80, 18 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 2268, 2270 (C. C. A. 6th, (1946).
68. Ibid.
69. Foremen, themselves, vigorously denied that they were functionally a part of
management and did not require the aid of the Wagner Act. Hearings Before the Com-
mittee on Military Affairs on H. R. 2239, H. R. 1742, H. R. 1728 and H. R. 992, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 299-318, 489-516, 614-695, 706-759.
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In the Packard case7" the Board petitioned the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit for enforcement of an order charging the
company with unfair labor practices. This was based upon the refusal
of the company to bargain with the Foremen's Association of America
which had been selected by a majority of the foremen in a Board
election.7 1 The company resisted the Board's order by contending that
foremen were not "employees" under the Act and therefore not
entitled to its privileges. As defined by the Circuit Court, the con-
trolling questions in the Packard case were "(1) whether the super-
visory employees involved herein are entitled to or excluded from the
privileges accorded by the National Labor Relations Act and (2) if
they are entitled to the privileges of the- Act whether the unit estab-
lished by the Board is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the
Act."72 A resolution of the basic question rested upon a construction
of the legislative intent and purpose with respect to coverage under the
Act. In upholding the Board a divided Court ruled that "the foreman,
although he is part of the front line of management in his obligation
to get out the work, to negotiate grievances and to perform the manifold
responsibilities . . . in his relationship to his employer with reference
to his own wages and conditions of labor [he] is an employee entitled
to the benefits of Section 157" of the Act. The Court also sustained
the Board's determination grouping general foremen, foremen, assistant
foremen and special assignment men ("trouble shooters") in- one unit.7"
A significant variation, however, appears in the judicial view respect-
ing the type of union organization sanctioned for supervisory employees
under the Act. Here the Court differed with the Board's policy by
conditioning certification of a union to act for supervisors under the
Act upon the basis of it being "independent and neither a part of nor
controlled by the union representing the production workers." 7 4 This
70. 64 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1945).
71. 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
72. 157 F. (2d) 80, 18 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 2268, 2271 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946).
73. Id. at 2273. "The authority to determine the appropriate unit is primarily vested
in the Board. Section 159 (b). If reasonably exercised, its decision cannot be set aside.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 146. Hearst
Publications, Inc., supra, 133."
74, Id. at 2274. "As found by the Panel of the War Labor Board, it is not appro-
priate for supervisors 'who are responsible for discipline, assignment of work, rate ad-
justments and promotions, who represent the employers in handling grievances of rank
and file workers, and who generally represent higher management in dealing with the
rank and file workers, to be subject to discipline by a union which is controlled directly
or indirectly by the men whom they supervise. The effectiveness of management requires
that it have its own uncontrolled agents to represent it in dealing with the rank and
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particular question was not specifically at issue in the Packard case.
The judicial restriction therefore should properly be regarded as dictum
rather than controlling. When the Board's later decisions in the L. A.
Young75 and Jones and Laughlin76 cases, holding the contrary, are
tested before the Courts, a definitive ruling should result.
Before considering the conflicting positions confronting the Court on
the basic issue, it is well to narrow the area of dispute and accordingly
confine the argument. That foremen had the right to form and join
unions was accepted without question.77 Nor were the parties divided
by any differences on the proposition that, independent of the Act,
foremen are employees as the term is commonly understood as well
as in legal effect.78 The crux of the issue was whether the Board had
exceeded its authority by so applying the Wagner Act as to grant to
foremen the same rights thereunder as enjoyed by rank and file
employees.
The Employer's Challenge to the Change in Board Policy
Close reasoning grounded on valid appraisals of experience and meas-
ured against established principles did not uniformly characterize the
position of either disputant. Rather both were marked by frequent
resort to "loose inference and dogmatic assertion." 7 But the intangibles
of labor relations invite conjecture from the very absence of sufficiently
stable rules of the game. In consequence, greater reliance falls upon
the capacity of "experts" 0 to distinguish subjectively the most effective
file, just as the rank and file are entitled to have their own uncontrolled representatives
for dealing with higher management.'"
75. 65 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 687 (1946).
76. 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 971 (1946).
77. In the oral argument before the Board, the Employer's counsel in reply to a
question by Board Member Houston, stated: "The foremen have a right to organize. We
do not deny that." Volume II of the Record, p. 1194. This precise point had pre-
viously been raised in NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F. (2d) 667, 6
LAB. REL. REP. Man. 967 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940). The court there held that the foreman
is an employee for the purpose of pressing his personal needs and demands upon his
employer.
78. The Federal Employers' Liability Act defines employees entitled to its benefits
as "any employee of a carrier." This definition, identical in terms with the definition
contained in Section 2 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, has been applied without
challenge to foremen. Owens v. Union Pacific R. Co., 319 U. S. 715 (1943). See also
Alaska Mining Co. v. Whelan, 168 U. S. 86, 89 (1897). Also so conceded by Circuit
Judge Simons in his dissent from the majority in the Packard case.
79. Mr Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 554 (1945).
80. For an excellent comprehensive study of the role of the "expert," see Butler,
The Rising Tide of Expertise (1946) 15 FoRDoHm. L. REV. 19, 48-50.
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way to achieve the broad objectives of the Act, as dictated by practical
considerations. Principles, then, do not evolve in response to a rule
of reason and law but are superimposed to fit a rule of immediate con-
venience. 8' This approach was apparent in that neither the employer
nor the Board gave heed to the warning of the Supreme Court that
".. .the old admonition never becomes stale that this Court is con-
cerned with the bounds of legal power and not with the bounds of
wisdom in its exercise by Congress. ' 82  So it was not a strange phe-
nomenon to find the employer's position which challenged the Board's
ruling before the Circuit Court to be, like the ruling itself, a curious
admixture of legal and practical arguments less concerned with the
state of the law than with what it should be.8" It was apparent that
less weight attached to strictly legal arguments than to a forecast of
the catastrophic dangers implicit in granting foremen bargaining rights
under the Wagner Act.
In an effort-at divining the Congressional intent in legalistic terms
the employer placed great reliance upon the unclear references in the
legislative history of the Act84 to "workers" and "labor" as disclosing
an intended limitation upon the term "employees" to the rank and file
rather than their supervisors.8 5 The failure of Congress expressly to
include "subordinate officials" within the definition of employees, as
Congress had in Section 1, of the Railway Labor Act of 1934,86 was
similarly urged as revealing a Congressional purpose to preclude those
performing supervisory functions.87 The Packard Company also argued
81. See Note (1944) 19 ST. JoH.N's L. REv. 47.
82. Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643, 650 (1944).
83. As in most similar controversies involving construction of the Wagner Act, undue
comfort was derived from the classic expression of Holmes that "the life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience." HoL-rEs, TnE CommoN 'LAw (1881) 1.
84. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1940).
85. For a summary of the Employer's position on this point, see the vigorous dissent-
ing opinions of Circuit Judge Simons both in the original decision on the Packard case
157 F. (2d) 80, 18 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 2268 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946), ard in the order denying
rehearing -F. (2d)-, 18 LAB. RaL. Rs . Man. 2432 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946). The same
argument was urged against recognition of clerical and other non-manual workers as
employees and was rejected as lacking in merit. NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F. (2d
570 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 129 (1937) ; See
McIver, Wagner and McGerr, Technologists" Stake in the Wagner Act (1944) AMERacA
Ass'N OF ENGINEERS.
86.. 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 151 (1940), Section 1 (5) of that Act
provides "The term 'employee' as used herein includes every person in the service of
a carrier . . . who performs any work defined as that of an employee or subordinate
official in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. .. "
87. The National Labor Relations Act was "an amplification and further clarification
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that supervisory employees allegedly had not participated in strikes
for collective bargaining rights prior to the enactment of the statute.8
The rationale was that since the Act ostensibly relates only to such
categories of employees as had created labor disturbances for collective
bargaining rights and who were therefore, exclusively in the contem-
plation of Congressional concern, no others were entitled to the deriv-
ative benefits."9 In a further effort to relate the objects of the A~t to
its position, the company emphasized the Report and Findings of a
Special Panel appointed by the National War Labor Board to investigate
disputes involving foremen." Upon the findings therein contained a
showing was attempted of the lack of substantial grievances or just
causes for complaint of foremen regarding their wages, hours and work-
ing conditions.9 From this was deduced the conclusion that the Act
could not apply since foremen had no need for collective bargaining.
No evil was therefore claimed to exist which invited statutory remedy.92
of the principles" of the Railway Labor Act. H. R. REP. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935) 3; See Matter of Soss Manufacturing Company, 56 N.L.R.B. 348, 350 (1944).
Also see Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. A. §
101 et seq. (1940), in which employees are contrasted with "owners of property." In
Section I of the National Labor Relations Act, the term "employers" was substituted
for "owners of property" and the balance of the clause was repeated verbatim.
88. A sharp issue of fact divided the parties on this point. The Board attempted
to establish a long previous history of union organization and activity by foremen ante-
dating the Act. (Record Vol. III, p. 1794); 1763, 1916-1924). Particular reference was
made to such collective bargaining in the printing, building, and metal trades, and in
the maritime and railroad industries. (U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bull. No. 745, Union Mem-
bership and Collective Bargaining by Foremen, pp. 1-5, 6-7). Since the Act, from July
1, 1943 through November, 1944, particularly, there were 20 strikes of supervisory em-
ployees involving 131,000 employees and causing the loss of 669,159 man-days of work,
of which 96 per cent was lost in strikes for recognition. TENTH ANNUAL REPORT or
N.L.R.B. (1945) 31. See also, PETERSON, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 221.
89. An interesting observation to consider on this argument was made by Professor Gray
when in his lectures on the "Nature and Sources of the Law" he stated, "The fact is
that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the legislature has had no
meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it;
when what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the legislature did mean
on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended
on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present." GRAY, NATURE AND
SOURCES or THE LAW (1909) 165.
90. REPORT AND FINDINGS OF A PANEL OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD IN CERTAIN
DISPUTES INvOLvING SUPERVISORS, Jan. 19, 1945, WLBA-3397.
91. Member Reilly in dissenting from the majority view in the Packard case, 61
N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), interpreted the War Labor Board findings to indicate "that the
standard foreman grievances, so repeatedly cited in argument before this Board
turned out to be largely fanciful." But see note 15 supra.
92. Resolving the controversy as to the Congressional purpose, requires it be tested
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Dealing with the consequences of the inclusion- of foremen, the em-
ployer urged that, if it were required to bargain collectively with a
foremen's union, the allegiance of its supervisors would be divided be-
tween management and the union. Management would thus be precluded
from accepting the judgment and discretion of foremen. This was con-
tended on the anticipated likelihood that the foremen would be influ-
enced less by their duty to the company than by their responsibility
to their union. By like reasoning an in terrorem argument was offered
that the foremen would become so subject to the pressures of rank and
file unions, as well as their own, as to destroy the basic relationship
between management and foremen upon which the employer relies for
efficiency in conducting its business.9 3 Portraying the special function
of foremen the employer also emphasized the position of the Board
and the Courts that supervisory employees are frequently deemed to
'speak for management even though unauthorized or directly forbidden
to do so.94
The Policy Crystalized
After the Board's initial determination in the Packard case that super-
visors could form an appropriate unit, 5 the question again came before
the Board upon the refusal of the employer to bargain with the union
involved." The same issues now confronted the Board anew. In the
interim Chairman Herzog had ascended to his position in place of
Millis.97 His judgment was called upon to settle the continuing contro-
"in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained." NLRB v.
Armour & Co., 154 F. (2d) 570, 17 LAB. RIEL. REP. 372, 373 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
As noted by Pound, "The emphasis has changed from the content of the precept and
the existence of the remedy to the effect of the precept in action and the availability
and efficiency of the remedy to attain the ends for which the precept was devised." Found,
Administrative Application of Legal Standards, (1919), A. B. A. REP., 415; Cf. Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COL. L. REv. 603 (1908).
93. This position was consistently argued from the initial presentation of the issue
to the Board in Matter of Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942). It reflects
the core of the employer's resistance to foremen unionization as creating a "divided loyalty"
role for supervisors which the Board and now the Courts are requested to avoid. Chair-
man Ierzog, in his concurring opinion in the Packard case noted that whenever foremen
and their employers "sit on the opposite sides of the bargaining table their interests are
momentarily adverse. This is true whether they bargain individually or collectively."
94. International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 72 (1940); NLRB v.
Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, 598 (1941); Matter of Tenn. Copper Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 117,
118 (1938); Matter of Inland Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. 783, 808 (1938); H. J. Heintz Co. v.
NLRB, 311 U. S. 514 (1941).
95. 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
96. 64 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1945).
97. Succeeded H. A. Millis, who resigned as of July 4, 1945.
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versy between Houston and Reilly. The determination of the issue,
so far as the Board was concerned, therefore, rested with the basic
philosophic concepts which the chairman brought to the Board. It must
be parenthetically noted that Chairman Herzog occupied the position
previously, and prior to his entry into the Armed Forces, as Chairman
of the New York State Labor Relations Board. That Board had earlier
ruled as appropriate a unit of supervisors in a decision in which Mr.
Herzog joined." It could therefore have been reasonably anticipated
that upon his elevation into the national scene the arguments which
were persuasive in the case before the New York State Labor Relations
Board would be equally effective when before him as the one holding
the decisive vote on the National Labor Relations Board. But mere
consistency did not operate as the controlling factor in the chairman's
decision. For he displayed in his opinion a rare feeling and regard
for the essence of employer-employee relationships in terms not of title
or designation, but rather of economic realities. Abandoning precise and
archaic judicial phrasing, Chairman Herzog, in an almost buoyant mood,
unabashedly reflected his deep and sweeping convictions on the right
of foremen to the full protection of the Act.9
The expressed warrant for the alteration of policy and abandonment
of precedent was the Board's developing awareness that the dangers
which had been envisioned as resulting from foremen inclusion under
the Act had not materialized. Affirmatively the Board now stated its
recognition of the "clear economic facts" and need to "protect the na-
98. Matter of Bee Line, Inc., 6 N.Y.R.B. 686 (1943). The New York Labor
Relations Board there noted the Maryland Drydock decision by the NLRB and flatly
rejected that doctrine in an opinion which parallelled the later prevailing opinion, also
by Mr. Herzog, in the Packard case. See to the same effect: Matter of Delparke Realty
Corp., 6 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 905 (1943); 8 N.Y.S.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 14-15, 28-30,(1944). These
rulings were affirmed by the highest court of New York in: In Matter of N.Y.S.L.R.B.
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 183 Misc. 1064, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 590 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
.afF'd nemo, 269 App. Div. 934, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (Ist Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N. Y.
836, 66 N. E. (2d) 853 (1946). See also Alleghany Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Kelley, 295
N. Y. 607, 64 N. E. (2d) 352 (1945). Pennsylvania has consistently followed the Mary-
land Drydock decision. Division 1327 of the Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Electric and
Motor Coach Employees v. Pennsylvania LRB, Pa. Ct. of Comm. Pls., 13 LAB. REL. REP.
Man. 910 (1944). Massachusetts was earlier in accord with the New York view. See
Matter of Sears, Roebuck & Co., Case No. CR 517, 8 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 393 (1941);
The Massachusetts Board later adopted the doctrine of the Maryland Drydock
,case. Hathaway Bakeries, Inc. v. Labor Relations Commission, -Mass.-, 55 N. E. (2d)
254, 14 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 647 (1944).
99. Some significance must necessarily attach to the circumstance that Chairman
Herzog here expressed one of his relatively ,infrequent differences with Member Reilly.
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tional interest" by giving foremen the benefits of the Act.'00 It was,
therefore, concluded that the continued denial of the Act to foremen
would deprive them of a substantial right, the granting of which would
not disadvantage Industry proportionately. In further rationalizing the
change and somewhat to relieve the discomfort entailed in again shifting
its position, the Board now argued that its Maryland Drydock decision' 0 '
was not based on any consideration of lack of statutory authority, but
rather upon one of considered expediency derived from the balancing
of dangers and advantages. The Board therefore felt free, in recon-
sidering the facts upon which its prior policy was predicated, to change
that policy in accordance with what it regarded as a more realistic
appraisal of the need of foremen for the protection of the Act and the
favorable consequences of granting such-relief. Rejecting the argument
for unit segregation of each level of foremen, formerly so persuasive
in the Studebaker case, 02 the Board also bluntly grounded its decision
for a single unit upon "compelling practical reasons". In the Board's
view, the collective bargaining process itself -was sufficiently flexible to
allow satisfactory adjustments by the parties of such problems as might
develop from the combination of various levels-of supervision in a single
100. The majority displayed an acute awareness of what they regarded as the "realities"
of the situation. Yet the transition from the doctrine of Union Collieries Coal Company
to Maryland Drydock to Packard completed a cycle that brought the Board back to
its initial policy. The indecisiveness of the judgments could perhaps best be explained
in terms of a search for the kind of "economic realities" on which a majority might
agree. A less cynical view might rest upon the observation of Cardozo to the effect
that "Courts know today that statutes are to be viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo,
as pronouncements of abstract principles for the guidance of an ideal community, but in
the setting and the framework of present-day conditions as revealed by the labors of
economists and students of the social sciences in our own country and abroad." CA.Dozo,
TnE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1925) 81.
101. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
102. 46 N.L.R.B. 1315: In connection with the composition of the bargaining unit
of supervisory employees, the Board is likely to exclude all supervisors in the higher
levels of management if their interests are shown to be inimical-to those of the groups
being organized. Matter of Simmons Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 174,-17 LAB. REL. REP. 820
(1946) and Matter of Fibreboard Products-Inc., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 17 LAI. REL. REP.
1066 (1946).
The, unit test also appears to be that, like the rank and file units, all members must
have a community of interest and not too great a disparity in rank. L. A. Young Spring
& Wire Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 687 (1946). Where common back-
ground and interests are close but a marked divergence exists in rank and authority
between levels, supervisory employees in the highest levels may elect whether or not
to be in the same unit as their subordinates. Hudson Motor Car Co., 67 N.L.R.B. No.
52, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 1259 (1946).
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unit." 3 This holding specifically reversed the Board's prior holdings
in the Murray Corporation case 0 4 and the Boeing Aircraft Company
case'o5 on the distinction that the same strong community of interest
between classes of supervisors was not established there as sufficiently
as in the Packard case.
Aside from the convenient resort to legalisms to justify a position
formerly abandoned as untenable, the motivating influence for the new
policy appeared to be a conviction by the majority of the Board that
the practical effect of the denial to foremen of access to the Board's
process would be to compel a trial by combat through use of economic
strength in order to force unwilling employers to grant recognition to
the foremen for purposes of collective bargaining. Such a trial, it was
considered, would be in derogation of the principal object of the Act
which was designed to avoid industrial strife or unrest as a means of
achieving collective bargaining rights and to substitute therefor the
orderly processes available through the National Labor Relations
Board. 06
A grappling with the fundamental problem, rather than preoccupation
with its periphery, was evidenced by the general reply to the conten-
tions made by the employer. This reply rested upon the concept of
the majority of the Board that the over-all grievance of foremen, as
of all employees, was "the denial by their employer of their right to
participate in the decisions which affect their welfare as employees."
Chairman Herzog writing the prevailing opinion of the Board in the
Packard case emphasized these considerations by stating:
"Just as rank and file employees before the passage of the Act were forced
to resort to tests of economic strength in order to gain recognition, so it is
today with supervisory employees. These are the plain and inescapable eco-
103. Chairman Herzog regarded the solution of the problems which might develop
from the Board's decision as a product of time and experience. He stated: "American
management has shown such resilient genius that, once foremen's representatives lose
their sense of insecurity and can adopt a policy of self-restraint, the parties will find a
way to resolve their occasional conflict of interest. Government cannot resolve that
conflict for them. But it can intercede to lay the groundwork for reasoned negotiation,
so that what seems anathema. today may become habitual tomorrow."
104. 51 N.L.R.B. 94 (1943).
105. 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943).
106. In concluding his opinion, Mr. Herzog observed on this point, "... it is better
that a Board dedicated to encouraging the bargaining process move forward, not back-
ward . . . and continue to put a premium on the conference table rather than on the
harsh arbitrament of industrial war. The more difficult the problem, the more important
it is that the stage be set for men to sit down and reason together." 64 N.L.R.B.
1212, 1216 (1945).
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nomic facts, and we think it therefore manifest that the time has come when,
in the interest of effectuating the policies of the Act, we must accord greater
recognition to the militantly expressed need of supervisory employees for
collective bargaining through their own organizations. . . . it must be re-
membered that foremen have the right to form and join labor organizations
apart from and outside the Act. This is a fundamental right, the right of
free association, which was not created, but implemented, by the Act. The
statute we administer was enacted to insure that this already existing right
could be exercised in a peaceful and orderly manner so that the flow of goods
and services in interstate commerce would not be 'interrupted. Thus, to deny
the foremen in this case the protection of the Act is not to deny them the
right to form and join their union or to demand collective bargaining ights
from their employer. It would only be a denial of access to peaceful pro-
cedures to exercise that right."'107
This position was fully adopted by the majority of the Circuit Court
in the Packard case.0" Brushing aside considerations urged by the
employer as to the extent to which foremen required the benefits of the
Act, the Court stated:
"If these foremen fall within the coverage of the statute it is immaterial
whether their grievances are or, are not great, for they have a right, just
as employees of the rank and file, to organize and bargain collectively. This
is the principal issue in the case."' 09
"Employees" under the Wagner Act as Broadly Construed
in the Hearst Case
Necessarily any approach to a construction of the Act compels the
consideration of the objects sought to be attained and the evil to be
remedied. From the language employed by Congress, particularly in
its statement of "Findings and Policy",'" explicit and unambiguous
purposes are described. Congress found that because employers had
denied employees organizational rights and refused readily to accede
to collective bargaining procedures strikes and other industrial unrest
resulted which burdened or obstructed commerce. Unless employees
were aided in overcoming their inequality in bargaining with employers
by being protected in their right to organize and bargaiii collectively,
the public welfare was adversely affected. This inequality and its con-
107. 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 14, 18 (1945).
108. 157 F. (2d) 80, 18 LAB. REL. REP. Man. 2268, (C. C. A. 6th, 1946).
109. Id. at 2271.
110. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940). NLRB v. -Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 146 .F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944); NTLRB v. Century Oxford Mfg.
Corp., 140 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1944).
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sequences could be overcome, Congress decided, by providing a free
and unhampered means for the selection of bargaining representatives
by employees while imposing on employers the-duty to bargain collec-
tively with such representatives. Within this framework of Congres-
sional intention must be tested any controversy as to the meaning of
an applicable statutory provision or term. The Supreme Court con-
strued this Congressional action as expansive in nature to a limit "so
far as its power can reach." '' The statute is unique in its freedom
from technical legal distinctions and complexities." 2 Emphasis is placed
upon the comprehensiveness of the language as revealing the broad
objectives. In the Hearst Publications case the Supreme Court stated
its view that the term "employee" used in Section 2 (3) of the Act, "like
other provisions, must be understood with reference to the purpose of
the Act and the facts involved in the economic relationship. 'Where all
the conditions of the relation require protection,' protection ought 'to
be given.' ""' The Court further noted that the task of defining the
term "employee" in cases as- they arise "has been assigned primarily
to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. Determination
of 'where all the conditions of the relation require protection' involves
inquiries for the Board charged with this duty. Everyday experience
in the administration of the statute gives it familiarity with the circum-
stances and backgrounds of employment relationships in various indus-
tries, with the abilities and needs of the workers for self-organization
and collective action, and with the adaptability of collective bargaining
for the peaceful settlement of their disputes with their' employers. The
experience thus acquired must be brought frequently to bear on the
question who is an employee under the Act. Resolving that question,
like determining whether unfair labor practices have been committed,
'belongs to the usual administrative routine' of the Board.""1
4
Since the Hearst case is likely to serve as the expression of applicable
doctrine by which the Supreme Court is to measure the Packard case,
a more than passing consideration' of the Hearst case is merited. The
case developed because four Los Angeles newspapers refused to bargain
collectively with a union of newsboys selling their papers on the streets.
111. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 125 (1944).
112. Id. at 120, 126-130.
The Court stated that Congress had no intention to constrict this remedial legislation
by a "mass of technicality" so that the "employee" concept at common law would so
prevail as to bar the benefits of the Act to persons who, not being independent entre-
preneurs, were entitled to its benefits.
113. Id. at 129.
114. Id. at 130.
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The technical basis for the refusal was, as with foreman in the Packard
case, on the ground that the newsboys were not "employees" under the
Act. The Board upheld the union in all respects." 5 However the Circuit
Court rejected the Board's findings and held that by common law stand-
ards the newsboys were not employees and were not therefore included
within the protection of the Act."' The Supreme Court reversed the
Circuit Court and held the newsboys to be employees under what has
been dubbed the "mischief-remedy test." '' n This test might be reduced
to its simplest terms: If the worker is a victim of the evils which the
Act was designed to correct, it must follow that the worker is the kind
of an "employee" intended by the Act. "The test of who is an employee
is social, rather than individual in its approach. It looks beyond narrow
and technical contractual rights to economic forces and their conse-
quences for its meaning and authority. In this sense it is a realistic
and practical attempt to formulate a flexible, workable concept of the
term 'employee.' ""s The majority in the Hearst case, while finding
newsboys to be employees under the Act, practically conceded them
not to be employees according to the common law meaning of the word.
And so the majority of the Court held, in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Rutledge, that common law tests derived from the law of master and
servant were not controlling. If they are not, the court said, "it cannot
be irrelevant that the particular workers in these cases are subject,
as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to
eradicate and that the remedies it affords are appropriate for preventing
them or curing their harmful effects in this special situation."' "
The majority of the Circuit Court in the Packard case leaned heavily
upon the concept of the term "employee" as stated by the Supreme
Court in the Hearst case. However, Circuit Judge Simons in his dissent
similarly relied upon the decision in the Hearst case to support his view.
In essence, the jurist declared that unless some limitation was placed
upon the term "employees", as intimated by the Supreme Court, the
strict application of the test suggested by the majority of the Circuit
Court would compel the inclusion not only of foremen but also of super-
intendents, department heads and executive officers. 20 He then pro-
115. 39 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1942).
116. 136 F. (2d) 608 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943).
117. NLRB v. Armour & Co., 17 LAB. REL. REP. 372 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
118. 32 CAin'. L. REv. 289, 296 (1944).
119. 322 U. S. 111, 127 (1944).
120. "Undoubtedly in ordinary parlance and by common law tests foremen are em-
ployers. So also are superintendents, department heads, managers and executive officers.
It'has been made plain, however, by the Supreme Court that in interpreting the National
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ceeded to the nub of his contention that the Court had no concern with
making policy but only with the interpretation of the statute. "Since-
controlling authority interprets the Labor Act as clothing supervisory
employees with the authority and responsibility of the employer, col-
lective bargaining provisions are not available to them. I am in accord
with the earlier view of the Labor Board and the Panel of the War
Labor Board and would deny enforcement to the present petition."'121
The Board's Power to Deny an Appropriate Unit to
Foremen as "Employees"
Neither the majority nor the dissenting Judge in the Circuit Court,
however, touched specifically upon whether the Board had power to
exclude foremen from the statutory protection of the right to bargain
collectively, through the method of holding a unit inappropriate so as
to accomplish such a result. In no particular instance did either opinion
affirmatively suggest the area of discretion available to the Board in
granting or withholding access to its processes after a preliminary
finding that supervisors were "employees" within the meaning of the
Act.
The employer contended that even if the foremen were found to be
"employees" the Board could, in its judgment, exclude them from bar-
gaining rights in accordance with the obligation so to proceed as to
"effectuate" the purposes of the Act.122 Since, it was argued, the fixing
of a separate unit from such supervisors would be undesirable, the Board
could, upon so concluding, exclude them. In response, the Board, in the
Packard decision evaded the precise question, and took the equivocal
position that, in the exercise of its discretion it would grant supervisors
the unit requested once it found them to be "employees". 123 Not until
Labor Relations Act common law tests are not controlling. So those who in other aspects
may be independent contractors are brought within the sweep of the term 'employees'
by underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously es-
tablished legal classifications." 18 LAn. REL. REP. Man. 2274 (1946).
121. Ibid.
122. This argument was based upon the provision in Section 159 (b) which requires
the Board to decide whether a particular unit in each case will "insure to employees
the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and
otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act." The Board had first held in the Mary-
land Drydock case that it enjoyed such power to deny certification by disapproving
every possible type of' unit for supervisory employees. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943). That
"power" was also exercised in Matter of Boeing Aircraft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943);
Matter of Murray Corp. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 94 (1943); and Matter of General
Motors Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 457 (1943).
123. However, the Board did argue before the Circuit Court that it had no power
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the L. A. Young Spring and Wire Corp. case 24 did the Board squarely
acknowledge its mandate for Congress as compelling the certification
of an appropriate unit for supervisory employees. This was based in
part upon the Report of the Congressional Committees on the Bill that
became the Act.' -° The Committees' indicated specifically that Section
8 (5) 12 was not a detachable part of the Act to be granted or denied
as a matter of choice to employees who had been granted the right to
self-organization and collective bargaining relieved of employer inter-
ference through the means enumerated in the four preceding subsections
of Section 8.127 The inclusion of Section 8 (5) in the Bill was explained
by the Senate Committee:
"It seems clear that a guarantee of the right of employees to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing is a mere delusion
if it is,not accompanied by the correlative duty on the part of the other party
to recognize such representatives as they have been designated (whether as
individuals or labor organizations) and to negotiate with them in a bona fide
effort to arrive ata collective bargaining agreement. . . Experience has proved
that neither obedience to law nor respect for law is encouraged by holding
forth a right unaccompanied by fulfillment. Such a course provokes constant
strife, not peace."'128
The House Committee also noted that "The fifth unfair labor practice,
regarding the refusal to bargain collectively, rounds out the essential
purpose of the bill to encourage collective bargaining and the making
of agreements."' 29
The Board therefore concluded that it could not ignore Section 8 (5)
for a particular class of employees. By reference also, the language of
Section 9 (b), read in connection with the other provision of the Act,
indicates the obligatory nature of the blanket provision. Section 9 (b)
provides:
"The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to em-
ployees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective
to deny to foremen who were "employees" under the Act, the statutory protection of the
right to bargain collectively by holding that they could not constitute an appropriate unit.
124. 65 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 687 (1946).
125. The Senate Report stated that the guarantee of the right to organize and bargain
collectively was intended for the -purpose of "encouraging the practice of collective bar-
gaining and protecting the rights upon which it is based." SENe. R P. No. 573, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 6. See also H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 8.
126. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (5) (1940).
127. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (1940).
128. SEN¢. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) p. 12.
129. H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) p. 20.
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit ap-
propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.1 130
The Board pointed out in the L. A. Young case' 31 that this language
"is language not of exclusion but of classification. We are to choose
between alternatives: Whether the appropriate unit for collective bar-
gaining purposes shall be the 'employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof.' The function of deciding the appropriate unit is
a positive one. 'It is not a negative concept to be used as a means of
denying all bargaining rights under the Act to a given group of em-
ployees in all circumstances.' Once the Board determines that certain
individuals are 'employees' within the meaning of the Act, its sole re-
maining duty under Section 9 (b) is to group these 'employees' in
that unit which will insure to them the full benefit of their right to
self-organization and to collective bargaining and otherwise effectuate
the policies of the Act.' Under the power to define the unit, the Board
may properly insist that foremen be organized in bargaining units apart
from their subordinates, but it cannot ostracize therfi." 32
Further support for the Board's more recent construction of the
requirements of Section 9 (b) is disclosed by examining the standards
delineated by Congress for the Board in making unit determinations.
The indications are that the Board's power is limited to determining
the composition of voting groups of employees and- not to decide whether
such employees should ever exercise the franchise, since Section 9 (b)
directs the Board to fix appropriate units in such a way as "to insure
to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to
collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this
Act."' 33 Although not so stated in the Packard case, the Board con-
130. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (b) (1940).
131. 65 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 117 LAB. REL. REP. 687 (1946).
132. Of particular significance was the quotation by the Board from the decision
of the New York State Labor Relations Board, Matter of Bee Line, Inc., 6 N.Y.S.L.R.B.
686,-695 (1943) previously joined in by Chairman Herzog.
133. The Circuit Court upheld the Board's exercise of discretion in grouping the super-
visory employees involved in one unit. After referring to the duties vested in the general
foremen, foremen, assistant foremen and special assignment men, the Court stated: "The
similarity of their obligations which compels them at times to act interchangeably, and
of the privileges which set them all off from the workers of the rank and file, make
them a group by themselves, necessarily experiencing the same needs, having in general
the same conception of the relationship between them and their employer." 18 LAB.
REL. REP. Man. 2268, 2273 (1946). See also THIRD A!N UAL REPORT OF THE NLRB
(1938) 180-183; Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees under the National Labor
Relations Act (1944) 29 IOWA L. REv. 297, 317-322.
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cluded before the Circuit Court, contrary to its previous view, that
such standards would not be respected by a unit determination which
had the effect of denying the full benefit of collective bargaining and
which prevented, rather than encouraged, the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining in acordance with the policy declared by Section
1 of the Act.
The Board's Control Over the Type of Labor Organization
Designated by Foremen in an Appropriate Unit
As previously noted, the Circuit Court upheld the Board. in the
Packard case but deviated in one respect."" Although not required to
do so by the matter at issue, the Court declared that its approval of
the Board ruling respecting foremen units was conditioned upon the
labor organization involved being unaffiliated and in no case a part
of the same union as represented the rank and file workers. Even.
though without controlling effect, this judicial pronouncement compels
consideration as touching upon a vital phase of the administration of
the Act far transcending the instant issue. It relates to a fundamental
element in the broad controversy and suggests an accord in spirit if
not by edict with the forecast of the disastrous effect of foremen being
granted the protective aegis of the Act in their own units. Similarly,
the extension of Board authority in this sphere entails a direct and
telling influence upon the structure and affairs of labor unions which -
might be difficult to delimit once established as a doctrine. The Court
was apparently persuaded to embark upon this controversial matter,
which was not at issue, by the potential dangers and the perilous effect
upon Industry which the members of the Court foresaw might result
from having both supervisory and other employees in the same labor
organization. 35 Yet no .statutory authority could be invoked to give
effect to the Court's view of the inadvisability of both groups through
separate local unions being affiliated to the same national union.'3 >
134. See note 74 supra.
135. The majority of the Circuit Court quoted with favor from the conclusions of
the War Labor Board panel which investigated the status of supervisory employees in
major automobile and shipping industries, including Packard, as follows: "The effective-
ness of management requires that it have its own uncontrolled agents to represent it
in dealing with the rank and file, just as the rank and file are entitled to have their
own uncontrolled representatives for dealing with higher management," 18 LAB. REL.
REP. Man. 2268, 2274.
. 136. As one writer recently noted on this point: "In fact, such a rationale runs counter
to the specific provisions, as, well as the spirit of the Act." Comment (1946), 55 YALE
L. J. 754, 765.
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Necessarily, by the terms of the Act, this question came within the
administrative discretion, deducible, by implication at least, from Sec-
tion 9 (c) of the Act, which provides that: "Whenever a question af-
fecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees,
the Board may [not must] investigate such controversy and certify to
the parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives that
have been designated or selected. '" 13l
In the Packard case the Board specifically withheld any decision or
exercise of discretion on this score since it found that the Foremen's
Association was in fact independent of rank and file employees, and
the issue was therefore not before it. More recently, however, in Matter
of Jones and Laughlin""5 the Board met the specific question reserved
in the Packard case, the issue being whether the Board had discretion,
to refuse to certify units of supervisory employees represented by labor
organizations affiliated with or admitting to membership rank and file
employees. The Board concluded in that case that it had not been
vested by Congress with the power to control the freedom of choice
of any unit of employees. It regarded as an abuse of its discretion the
withholding of certification from any representative so chosen by super-
visory employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. This was a return
in general view to that stated in the Godchaux Sugars case.'3 9 There
it was also indicated that Section 1 of the Act required the same result
when it stated the Congressional policy to be the encouragement of
"the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing.
14 °
In further support of the position that it lacked authority to limit
the choice of representatives, reliance was placed by the Board upon
the Supreme Court decision in Hill v. Florida.4' The Court" in that
case held to be invalid a statute of the State of Florida which attempted
to limit those who could act as employee collective bargaining represen-
tatives. The Court explicitly stated that: "Congress attached no con-
137. In the absence of an order by the Board under this section, the Courts are
without jurisdiction to review. It would appear to follow that the failure of the Board,
in its discretion, to apply the section, cannot be .judicially mandated. See NLRB v.
Standard Oil Co., 124 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941); NLRB v. National Mineral Co.,
134 F. (2d) 424, 426, 427 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 753 (1943). Such
review of representation cases has also been specifically excepted by the recently enacted
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 11, 1946)
§ 5; 18 LAB. RE.. REP. 76 (1946).
138. 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 971 (1946).
139. 44 N.L.R.B. 874, 877 (1942)
140. Cf. 79 CoNG. REc. 2336 (1945).
141. 325 U. S. 538 (1945).
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ditions whatsoever to their freedom of choice in this respect. Their
own best judgment, not that of someone else, was to be their guide.
'Full freedom' to choose an agent means freedom to pass upon the
agent's qualifications."'1 42 The Board concluded that it had no greater
power than the State of Florida, in view of the Court's holding, to
attempt to superimpose its judgment upon that of the employees as
to who should represent them.143
Another consideration in this connection is likely to foreclose a
determination by the Supreme Court adverse to the Board's ruling on
this issue. Since it would appear that the matter is either beyond the
discretion of the Board or within its discretion, the- practical result in
this instance will be the same. The Board, having decided that it would
not restrict the collective bargaining representative selected by super-
visors by sucli conditions as the Circuit Court found advisable in the
Packard case, exercised discretion, which if so regarded, is not review-
able. It does not appear to constitute that 1 ind of quasi-judicial dis-
cretion which the courts may review as distinguished from adminis-
trative discretion which is not reviewable;' 44 rather it falls within the
same category as the Board's action in issuing or refusing to issue a
complaint or in directing or refusing to direct an election. 46 So, had
the Board refused to conduct elections in foremen's units where affiliated
labor organizations were petitioners, it would seem that such action
could no more have been judicially reviewed .than similar refusals to
direct elections on other grounds.'46
142. Id. at 541.
143. See Chief Justice Stone, dissenting on other grounds in Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146, 171-172 (1941), where he stated that:
". .. the function assigned to the Board is not the choice of the labor organization
to represent a bargaining unit, for that is to be the free choice of the majority of
the employees in some defined group of employees which the Board finds to constitute
the appropriate unit."
144. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 25-26 (1929); Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 141, 146 (1940);
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 236 (1936); New England
and Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 196-199 (1923); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310
U. S. 113, 127-128 (1940); Confiscation Cases, 74 U. S. 454, 458-459, 463 (1868).
145. Anthony v. NLRB, 132 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942); NLRB v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 309 U. S. 206, 226 (1940).
146. See, e.g., May Department Stores v. NLRB, -U. S-, 66 Sup. Ct. 203, 206
(1945) in which Mr. Justice Reed stated: "Under Section 9 (b) the Board is delegated
the authority to determine the unit. The judicial review afforded is not for the purpose
of weighing the evidence upon which the Board acted and perhaps to overrule the
exercise of its discretion, but to 'guaranty against arbitrary action by the Board.'"
The quoted section in the opinion is from SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess
(1935) p. 14.
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Whether the attitude of the Circuit Court will be projected into the
reasoning and conclusions of the Supreme Court is uncertain. However,
it will provide an interesting demonstration of judicial ratiocination if
that Court would concurrently seek to sustain the administrative dis-
cretion of the Board while imposing a limitation upon its exercise in
a particular matter in which the Court may be in disagreement with
the Board's conclusions.
Conclusion
Of all administrative agencies to which Congress has delegated gov-
ernmental functions, the National Labor Relations Board appears least
inhibited by statutory strictures. In consequence of the spare legis-
lative yardsticks provided to measure their application of the Act, the
Board members have often indulged in well-meaning but inconstant
expressions of current policy. Suspended judgments have passed cur-
rency as doctrine. Confusion has marred the uniformly scrupulous, if
occasionally misdirected, performance of its personnel. That confusion
has been twice confounded in that parties frequently could neither
anticipate nor avoid the often unforeseeable consequences of any pat-
tern of behaviour by management or employee representatives however
innocent or calculated. It was not merely a straining after a neatly
turned phrase that inspired the characterization of the Board's rulings
as "the wilderness of single cases."
Much of the difficulty was unavoidable. A relatively uncharted
field of governmental action was the base on which pragmatic tests
could vie with flexible concepts for supremacy. Necessarily, policies,
apparently firmly entrenched by sound reasoning processes, were later
abandoned as unstable miscalculations. The absence of more rigid limi-
tations imposed by the statute was both a blessing and a misfortune.
It invited experimentation, but held the Board members to sharp ac-
count for the consequences. Out of the welter of confusion there is
still -seeking for emergence what might be termed a governmental labor
policy.14 7 Such a policy, if it is possible to evolve, will provide not
only orderly processes for settling differences, but fixed rules and per-
ceptible standards instead of an inconstant schematic system. Stare
decisis and respect for precedent are likely then to be more familiar
characteristics of Board policy than the shifts in "principle" which
fluctuate with the realignments of the Board members. Against this
background it is not altogether strange that the foreman question should
have been so often solved in so many different ways. The issue directly
.147. Rothenberg, Economics and Labor Law (1946), g0 DICK. L. REv. 153.
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involves the traditional equilibrium between management and labor, a
relationship which sharply'invites stabilizing as a means of achieving
more than ephemeral industrial peace.
A decision by the Supreme Court in -the Packard case would be most
welcome as settling the broad phase of the question of foremen status
under the Wagner Act and removing it beyond further alteration of
policy particularly "when Board consistency depends primarily upon
unchanging Board personnel."' 48 It may reasonably be expected that
the Supreme Court will not only uphold the decision in the Packard
case, but is likely to sustain the Board in the Jones and Laughtin case
as well. It requires no clairvoyant sense to envision that the pace of
industrialization will increase in tempo and that centralization, stand-
ardization and technological advances will continue to subordinate the
foreman's role so that by economic pressures his orientation would be
increasingly that of an employee and less that of part of management.
The Court, faced by this reality and buttressed by what is likely to
be deemed the Congressional purpose in its broader aspects, may be
expected to resolve the issue ultimately in the light of the aim of super-
visory employees to implement their presently enjoyed right to union-
ization by the concomitant advantage of access to the benefits and
protections of the-National Labor Relations Act.
148. Comment (1946) 55 YALE L. J. 754, 774. See also note 52 supra.
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